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Dilemma of expertise 
Democratising expertise and socially robust 
knowledge 
Helga Nowotny 
This paper presents arguments for the inherent 
‘transgressiveness’ of expertise. First, it must 
address issues that can never be reduced to the 
purely scientific and purely technical, and hence 
must link up with diverse practices, institutions 
and actors. Second, it addresses audiences that 
are never solely composed of fellow-experts, 
whose expectations and modes of understanding 
reflect the heterogeneous experience of mixed 
audiences. Recent demands for greater account-
ability have created a vast site for social experi-
mentation, especially on the supra-national level, 
which are briefly reviewed. However, the democ-
ratisation of expertise also creates tensions, es-
pecially on the institutional level. Moving from 
reliable knowledge towards socially robust 
knowledge may be one step forward in negotiat-
ing and bringing about a regime of pluralistic 
expertise. 
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HE DILEMMA OF EXPERTISE has been 
with us for some time. Plato lets Socrates take 
an outrageously (in modern terms) élitist posi-
tion. He argues in favour of the aristocratic faction 
in the Greek polis, for those who understand and 
possess knowledge about the “immutable laws of 
geometry”. He lashes out against the distortions and 
the irrationality that characterise the formation of 
public opinion and the articulation of political will 
among the ‘mob’. To overcome the corruption and 
disorder that appear to threaten his native Athens, 
Plato’s solution was to find an immutable anchoring 
point outside the cacophony of political, social and 
economic interests of his time. 
The lure of such an ‘external’ certainty, whether 
enshrined in the laws of the gods, of geometry or of 
Nature, has been with us ever since. The modern 
‘agora’ (meeting place) can hardly be said to be 
populated by the ‘mob’. It is inhabited by a highly 
articulate, and never before so well-educated popula-
tion. Experience of participating, at least in liberal 
western democracies, should also have taught citi-
zens how to express their views and articulate their 
demands. Today, there is a widespread expectation 
that science not only ought to listen to these de-
mands, but also can satisfy them. The incorporation 
of science into the modern agora, therefore, is an 
expression of confidence in its potentiality, not a 
loss of trust. 
Nevertheless, recognising the need for expert 
knowledge and to understand the role it plays in 
leading to the right decisions, has not resulted in 
solving the dilemma of expertise. Expertise has 
never before been so indispensable, while being  
T
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simultaneously so hotly contested. The question of 
whose knowledge is to be recognised, translated and 
incorporated into action has been exacerbated under 
the pressure for democratisation. It has received ad-
ditional exposure under the constant scrutiny of the 
mass media. It is highlighted and challenged by hav-
ing to manage uncertainty about such diverse issues 
and public concerns as climate change, BSE (bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy or ‘mad cow disease’), 
GMOs (genetically modified organisms) or stem cell 
research. 
Yet the dilemma of expertise and its vulnerability 
is not the result of any risk society. Rather, in the 
provocative verdict of Niklas Luhmann (1996), “so-
ciety is shocked by its risks because there is no solu-
tion to this problem”. This is not a denial of the need 
to assess, manage and contain risks, but the assertion 
that in modern societies there can be no safe way of 
making decisions. Decisions are events to distin-
guish between our observations of the past and an-
ticipations of the future. To the extent that the future 
depends on the decisions taken by others, it becomes 
even more uncertain. Systems and individuals attrib-
ute risks, turning risk therefore into a problem of 
attribution which remains inherent to modern society 
(Luhmann, 1996). 
Expertise has always been pragmatic as well as 
transgressive. Its pragmatism results from being de-
fined in particular contexts. When acting as experts, 
scientists do not respond to questions that they have 
chosen — in contrast to their research. Conse-
quently, they are forced to transgress the limits of 
their competence. There are situations in which they 
are under instant and intense pressure to respond to a 
crisis in decision-making, when neither all necessary 
knowledge nor sufficient information is available, 
uncertainties abound and yet action must be taken. 
Experts have to synthesise all available knowledge 
and of necessity transgress the boundaries of their 
discipline as well as the constraints of their own limits 
of knowledge. Frequently, they feel under pressure of 
having to act as if they knew the answers and the con-
ditions under which the answers will unlock an un-
known future. The right of experts to say in public 
“we do not know” has been won only recently, as the 
consequence of public scandals that have led to a 
break with ignoble silence or overt lying. 
Expertise is transgressive in two senses. First, it 
must address issues that can never be reduced to the 
purely scientific and purely technical. The issues 
expertise confronts, the practices that are to be ana-
lysed and assessed as to their consequences, are 
characterised by overlaps and interlinkages that bind 
the specialised scientific knowledge to its local and 
societal context. To have any predictive value at all, 
expertise must be able to understand the interlink-
ages that bind diverse practices, institutions and 
networks of diverse actors together. 
The second sense in which expertise is transgres-
sive is that it addresses audiences that are never 
solely composed of fellow-experts. The narratives of 
expertise have to be sensitive to a wide range of de-
mands and expectations and relate to the heteroge-
neous experience of mixed audiences. Speaking only 
to decision-makers, like ‘speaking truth to power’, 
has become a risky strategy in itself in an age in 
which transparency, public access to deliberations 
and assessment procedures, are the order of the day. 
The inherent transgressiveness of expertise in-
creases its vulnerability to contestation. By defini-
tion, experts speak about matters that transcend their 
competence as defined in purely scientific–technical 
terms. Even the protection provided by speaking in a 
collective voice, to give advice as a committee and 
to generate authority in a self-authorising way, does 
not confer immunity against contestation. Nor are 
recurrent, but futile attempts helpful, that seek to 
tighten the boundaries of scientific–technical exper-
tise to prevent them trespassing. The complexities of 
the social and political world demand the contrary: a 
widening of scientific–technical expertise, exercises 
in comparative judgement and the ability to move 
back and forth, that is, to transgress the boundaries 
between specialised knowledge and its multiple, 
many-layered (and often unforeseeable) context of 
implication. 
Accountability and international regulations 
Undoubtedly, the recent demands for greater ac-
countability have created in many European coun-
tries a vast new site for experimentation, seeking to 
extend the notion of expertise beyond the traditional 
definition of knowledge coming from certified sci-
entific and technical experts (de Jong and Mentzel, 
2001). In a recent EU (European Union) working 
document, experts are declared to have become “key 
actors of governance: either as proactive agenda-
setters in their own right or, more often, as resources 
for actors in government, business and civil soci-
ety”(EC, 2001). 
Such a widened role and public acknowledgement 
of the importance of expertise for enriching the pol-
icy process is, however, only part of the story. Less 
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noticed, but at least as important, is the extension of 
expertise beyond the confines of the nation-state in 
which it originally arose and was certified. The re-
cent interest on the part of national governments and 
policy-makers, especially at EU level, to ensure 
greater accountability has a double edge. It repre-
sents a reaction towards current debates around is-
sues of great public concern. It seeks to become 
proactive by widening access, by creating greater 
transparency and, more generally, by seeking to de-
mocratise expertise. 
In order to succeed, new sources of legitimacy 
must be generated. Gaining legitimacy on the do-
mestic (EU) front, will also help to push forward the 
agenda of moving into international regulatory ter-
rain. Prompt policy responses can only succeed in-
ternationally, if there is sufficient regulatory density 
and transnational co-ordination or harmonisation of 
efforts. Where international agreements or scientific 
reference systems do not exist, they must be set up. 
Democratising expertise has not only an internal 
political market, but an external, global one. The 
scarce resources are legitimacy and trust. If they can 
be mobilised internally, transnational regulatory ex-
pansion will be more credible. 
It is probably too early to seriously assess these 
approaches and their longer-term impact. However, 
it is no coincidence that trying to build up new forms 
of engagement between policy-makers, experts, the 
media and the public at large is so pronounced on 
the supra-national level. The need, and opportuni-
ties, to mobilise new sources of legitimacy for gov-
ernance structures operating at this level is as 
evident as is the demand for regulatory frameworks 
that surpass, complement or harmonise national 
regulatory regimes. 
In regulatory fields, expert advisory committees 
are often confronted with the need to study concepts 
or set standards whose existence either has not been 
an issue before or which necessitate addressing issues 
that are technical, social, scientific, normative or 
regulatory (Jasanoff, 1990). At EU level, this opens 
the possibility for developing a kind of expertise that 
can more easily integrate criteria that fell traditionally 
into established competencies within national regula-
tory bureaucracies or have yet to be set up. 
The trend towards greater accountability may take 
different forms. Perhaps the most visible one is to 
extend the notion of who is an expert and to stipulate 
from the beginning that there are different kinds of 
expertise that may become relevant in the policy 
process or — an even wider goal — are to be re-
garded as an integral part of ‘good governance’. The 
now highly fragmented and often localised experi-
mentation with public participatory models, such as 
consensus conferences, ‘publi-fora’ and other prac-
tices in deliberative democracy, may obtain a more 
stable, although more removed, form by becoming 
institutionalised on the supranational level. By 
bringing in those previously excluded — at least 
symbolically (Shove and Rip, 2000) — the social 
distribution of expertise is recognised as instrumen-
tal in achieving good governance. 
Greater accountability can, however, also be 
sought by changing the ‘institutionalised habits of 
thought’, by altering the ‘how’ of expertise and not 
only the ‘who’ or the ‘what’. Sheila Jasanoff (2002), 
in her recent call for “technologies of humility”, 
pleads for us to turn away from the technologies of 
predictive policy analysis, grounded in over-
confidence in their own accuracy and certainty. She 
wants them replaced by methods that try to come to 
grips with the fringes of human understanding — the 
unknown, the uncertain, the ambiguous and the un-
controllable. 
The four focal points are framing, vulnerability, 
distribution and learning. They encompass questions 
such as: what is at issue?; who will be hurt?; who 
benefits?; and how can we know?. Under such a re-
gime of humility, the existing predictive approaches 
would be complemented or replaced by an approach 
that makes apparent the possibility of unforeseen 
consequences, to make explicit the normative within 
the technical and to acknowledge from the start the 
need for plural viewpoints and collective learning. 
Thus, expertise would be opened up, not primarily 
by extending membership in advisory committees to 
the public or by securing public access to the delib-
erations of expert committees, but by changing the 
latter’s epistemological approach and their basic  
political attitude. It remains to be seen how such  
a transformation can be brought about without  
transforming the institutional framework and the 
recruitment procedure of experts professing such 
humility and how far these technologies will alter 
the conduct of their deliberations and the nature of 
their predictions. 
The tendency on the part of all concerned — be 
they national governments or the European Com-
mission, scientists, regulators, professional reflex-
ologists or representatives of patients organisations 
— to come to terms with a bewildering complexity 
of how knowledge and decision-making, expertise 
and action can be linked, creates entanglements of a 
kind that surpass the regulatory sciences. The “regu-
latory worlds” (Hagendijk, 2002) we increasingly 
inhabit, are spreading faster than any risk society, 
Democratising expertise has not only 
an internal political market, but an 
external, global one: the scarce 
resources are legitimacy and trust and, 
if they can be mobilised internally, 
transnational regulatory expansion 
will be more credible 
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although we are overwhelmed at times by the per-
ception of new risks and uncertainty. It is especially 
with regard to uncertainty that scientific and techni-
cal expertise continues to play an indispensable part 
in attempts to manage it. 
This cannot occur in isolation, separate and sepa-
rable from the social, economic, political and cul-
tural contingencies, nor from the heterogeneous sites 
where the need to cope with uncertainty arises. The 
challenges posed by the social distribution of exper-
tise and its ongoing societal contextualisation, lies in 
the nature and robustness of links it can build with 
other types of knowledge, other kinds of experience 
and expertise. 
Expertise, of whatever kind, is based on experi-
ence of some kind, even though experience tends to 
be eclipsed by or subsumed under certified expertise 
The reductionistic–analytic model of science (which 
has served science well in other respects) reaches its 
limits here. Mode 1 science needs to be comple-
mented by Mode 2 science and its respective model 
of expertise (Nowotny et al, 2001). 
Tensions generated 
Democratising expertise can be pursued in different 
ways and achieved in different degrees. Yet tensions 
are likely to arise, regardless of the route taken. 
They arise on the epistemological, the political and 
the institutional level. On the epistemological level, 
for instance, the tension between rights that accrue 
from professional expertise (be it ‘contributory’, 
‘interactional’ or ‘referred’ expertise) and those 
originating from more diffuse political rights, has 
not been thoroughly addressed. While not denying 
the stakeholders’ rights, the argument goes, they 
cannot have the same weight as those of professional 
experts (Collins and Evans, 2002). 
On the political level, a strong tension manifests 
itself with regard to moral expertise. The boom in 
ethics committees, ethics courses and a new brand of 
bio-ethics specialists who advise pharmaceutical 
corporations, testifies to the importance and popular-
ity of the ethical dimension. The moral vernacular of 
the ethics discourse appeals against an overriding 
market culture. With the voice of its post-modern 
universalism, the moral expertise of ethics can pre-
sent itself as protector of things, species and of a 
concept of human dignity above history (for in-
stance, Fukuyama, 2002). 
This is not to deny the need for regulation and 
safeguards in research and clinical settings, but the 
all-embracing, universalistic claims of moral exper-
tise often make it difficult to link up with other kinds 
of knowledge and expertise. Sometimes belittled as 
merely providing an alibi function for political deci-
sions, moral expertise runs the risk of serving as an 
alibi against the democratisation of expertise. 
Other tensions arise on the institutional level. In 
the USA, for instance, studies to ‘prove’ the low 
risks of genetically modified crops are predomi-
nantly carried out by the industry that generates 
transgenic plants or food. The job of government 
regulators is little respected and highly pressured; 
simple in concept and complex in practice: to medi-
ate between the corporate drive for profit and the 
public’s need to be protected from damaging effects. 
Industry’s position on regulatory control is 
equally predictable: the corporations favour de-
creased oversight, arguing that stakeholders are the 
best arbitrators of safety, and regulation is too ex-
pensive or hampering to economic growth and com-
petitiveness (Winston, 2002). ‘Democratising 
expertise’ in the ‘genetically modified zone’ would 
mean to move resolutely towards the middle ground 
and to accord greater weight to more ‘neutral’ public 
research institutions, that have the capability of car-
rying out more accurate, unbiased and comprehen-
sive research concerning the risks of transgenic 
crops and food. 
Another approach taken at the institutional level 
consists of the systematisation and routinisation of 
experience. Expertise thus becomes a result of evi-
dence-based experience. The systematic uptake of 
review processes, the spread of auditing and assess-
ment procedures, the introduction of performance 
indicators and bench-marking exercises, and the 
widespread introduction of evidence-based medicine 
and, more recently, evidence-based policy, are re-
sponses pointing in the direction of greater account-
ability, but they do so in a specific way. 
‘Democratising expertise’ takes the form of de-
personalising and standardising other forms of 
knowledge, experience and expertise. They are nec-
essarily abstracted from the local contexts in which 
they originally arose. Verification procedures and 
practices are objectified by setting up systematic 
scientific reference systems and similar procedures. 
In principle, the experience of participants and of 
relevant social groups, their attitudes, perceptions 
and even specific vulnerabilities can all be acknowl-
edged, incorporated and taken into account. 
However, to make the systematisation and routi-
nisation of experience and expertise operational, 
knowledge has to be codified, experience has to be-
come standardised. Relevant knowledge and exper-
tise now no longer fall outside the remit of 
scientific–technical expertise, but the result is 
unlikely to be a ‘technology of humility’. It is closer 
to becoming another ‘technology of certainty’, as-
sured of its in-built power to predict and control. It 
aims to be ‘robust’ on the institutional level, but its 
‘social robustness’ will only come about when it 
remains open to continuous social monitoring, test-
ing and adaptations. 
It is reminiscent of the various moves towards ‘ob-
jectification’ that occurred towards the end of the 19th 
century. ‘Mechanical objectivity’ was introduced at 
the time when face-to-face interaction among scien-
tists and their mutual trust no longer seemed guaran-
teed because of the expansion of the science system 
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(Daston and Galison, 1992). Mechanical objectivity, 
based on standardised and internationalised meas-
urements and techniques did restore the essential ele-
ment of trust by transferring it from persons and their 
subjective judgement to mechanical, impersonal and 
hence ‘objective’ devices. 
The push towards expert systems, benchmarking 
and evidence-based policy pursues a direction dif-
ferent from that exemplified by efforts to ‘democra-
tise expertise’ through participatory models or by 
developing ‘technologies of humility’. At best, these 
expert systems might become technologies of plural-
ising expertise. They will contain a strong element 
of evidence-based experience and the expertise that 
goes with it. 
This is a far cry from bringing in lay participants 
and their knowledge as being as valuable as, al-
though different from, that of scientific and technical 
experts. To function efficiently, however, evidence-
based pluralistic expert systems will need to be con-
tinuously updated and reassessed themselves. Socie-
tal monitoring in one form or another will continue 
to challenge the pluralisation of expertise, in the 
name of ‘democratising’ it. 
From reliable to socially robust knowledge 
In Re-Thinking Science (Nowotny et al, 2001) I have 
argued, together with my colleagues Michael Gib-
bons and Peter Scott, for moving beyond merely 
reliable knowledge towards socially more robust 
knowledge. This does not mean that the basic condi-
tions and processes that have been underpinning the 
production of reliable knowledge are necessarily 
compromised. Reliable knowledge remains the in-
dispensable conditio sine qua non of the fact that 
‘science works’. 
However, if reliable knowledge, produced within 
the relevant peer group of scientists (Ziman, 1978), 
has been found wanting, it is not because of any de-
ficiency in its reliability. Rather, reliable knowledge, 
as validated in its disciplinary context, is no longer 
self-sufficient or self-referential once its ‘deliver-
ables’ are contested or refused. It is being challenged 
by a larger community that insists its voice should 
be heard and that some of its claims are as valid, on 
democratic grounds, as those of more circumscribed 
scientific communities. 
Socially robust knowledge has three, closely in-
terrelated aspects. First, robustness is tested for va-
lidity not only inside the laboratory. The test 
typically occurs outside the laboratory, in a world in 
which social, economic, cultural and political factors 
shape the products and processes resulting from sci-
entific and technological innovation. 
Second, social robustness is most likely to be 
achieved through involving an extended group of 
experts, of real or symbolic users and of real or 
‘imagined’ lay persons. In this process of extension, 
the notion of what constitutes expertise, its role and 
function, undergo changes in meaning (Nowotny, 
2000). Put briefly, expertise spreads throughout so-
ciety and becomes socially distributed expertise. 
Experts must now extend their knowledge, not sim-
ply to be an extension of what they know in their 
specialised field, but to consist of building links and 
trying to integrate what they know with what others 
want to, or should, know and do. Bringing together 
the many different knowledge dimensions involved 
constitutes specific mixes with other kinds of 
knowledge, experience and expertise. 
Third, since society is no longer only an addressee 
of science, but an active partner participating in the 
production of social knowledge, the robustness of 
such knowledge results from having been repeatedly 
tested, expanded and modified. 
Obviously, social robustness is a relational term. 
It describes a process, and not a product. What can 
and will contribute to knowledge becoming socially 
robust is itself the result of an iterative process. It 
differs from the systematised pluralism of expertise 
in two respects. First, it remains contextual in the 
sense that it will take on different forms on the epis-
temological, institutional and political level. 
Second, it pushes the epistemological and institu-
tional initiative ‘up-stream’, into the research proc-
ess and to the research sites where new knowledge is 
generated. Scientists do remember that a public 
judgement about the acceptance or rejection of the 
‘deliverables’ they produce is a valid judgement, 
although based on non-scientific criteria. They are 
aware of the societal context for their work, in which 
they encounter real and imaginary ‘interlocutors’. In 
these situations, language, and therefore 
communication, matters. So does history, which may 
resurface in unexpected places and at unexpected 
moments, framing in terms of previous events or 
memories that Nature has no need to frame. Socially 
robust knowledge can extend to expertise one of its 
main characteristics: the ability to resist in a social 
world through continued testing of the sources of 
resistance and strengthening or modifying the 
knowledge accordingly. 
Between unconditioned acceptance and hostile re-
jection, there remains space for negotiation. We 
Socially robust knowledge has three, 
interrelated aspects: it is tested for 
validity outside as well as inside the 
laboratory; it is most likely to be 
achieved by involving an extended 
group of experts; it results from 
having been repeatedly tested, 
expanded and modified 
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have called it the ‘agora’. This archaism was delib-
erately chosen to embrace the political arena and the 
market place, and to go beyond both. The ‘agora’ is 
the problem-generating and problem-solving envi-
ronment in which the contextualisation of knowl-
edge production takes place. It is populated not only 
by arrays of competing ‘experts’ and the organisa-
tions and institutions through which they bring their 
knowledge and experience to bear on decisions 
taken, but also variously jostling ‘publics’. 
The ‘agora’ is in its own right a domain of pri-
mary knowledge production, through which people 
enter the research process and where knowledge 
(Mode 2 knowledge) is embodied in people, proc-
esses and projects. If we all are experts now, the or-
der and ordering of the regime of pluralistic 
expertise will be played out and negotiated in this 
public space. 
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